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Abstract
In 2002 the Danish government reduced the size of cash transfers to new
refugees. We exploit the reform to study the eﬀect of lower transfers on ed-
ucational outomces of refugee children. Surprisingly, the reduction in parental
beneﬁts has no negative eﬀect on educational outcomes of the children, such as
test scores, probability of completion of the 9th grade or probability of enrollment
in upper-secondary education. Likewise, children of parents aﬀected by the re-
form are not forced to earn more in youth. Refugee parents increase their labour
supply and earn more to compensate for the loss in income, but on average the
increase in earnings does not compensate for the decline in beneﬁts.
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1 Introduction
More than 3 million individuals have sought asylum in the EU since the beginning
of the Syrian Civil War in 2011. 27.4 percent or 829,400 persons among the asylum
seekers were children, who either arrived with their families or asked for protection as
unaccompanied minors.1 Sweden, Denmark and Norway alone have granted almost 0.5
million residence permits to refugees and their family members, 169,100 of which were
granted to children.
To limit the burden on public ﬁnances, it is crucial that the refugees are integrated
in the labour market, and that their children get an education which provides them
with the skills to ﬁnd a job when they grow up. Another way of limiting the burden on
public ﬁnances is to cut down on refugee-related expenditures. In September last year
the Danish governement introduced the so-called integration beneﬁt which in eﬀect
reduced the cash beneﬁt given to refugees by approximately 40 percent.2 Reducing
beneﬁts may motivate refugees to ﬁnd a job. On the other hand, it may take refugees
several years to ﬁnd employment initially, if they can ﬁnd one at all (Bevelander 2016,
Bratsberg et al. 2016, Konle-Seidl and Bolits 2016, Aiyar 2016, Schultz-Nielsen 2016).
These families will face a lower income which could have adverse eﬀects on integration.
For instance, it could force refugees to cut down on educational expenditures or move
to an area with schools of lower quality. This will harm the educational outcomes of
the refugee children and, consequently, their probability of future employment.
In this paper we investigate the eﬀect of the reduction in cash beneﬁt transfers to
refugees on the educational outcomes of their children. We use the introduction of the
so-called Start Help (in Danish: Starthjælp) beneﬁt to refugees in Denmark on the 1st of
July, 2002 which by construction is very similar to the integration beneﬁt introduced in
2015. Our identiﬁcation relies on the fact that all refugee parents arriving after reform
cutoﬀ were entitled to Start Help whereas the group arriving just before the reform
1Eurostat\migr_asyappctza.
2The exact size of the reduction varies somewhat with the number of chil-
dren in the family, age of the parents etc. The 40 percent reduction holds for
a family consisting of two parents, both older than 30, with children. Source:
http://bm.dk/da/Aktuelt/Pressemeddelelser/Arkiv/2015/07/Straksindgreb%20paa%20asylomraadet%20-
%20ny%20integrationsydelse%20til%20nytilkomne%20udlaendinge.aspx.
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continued to receive the full cash beneﬁt amount (in Danish: kontanthjælp) without
any exemptions. The exogenous reform cut-oﬀ prevents selection of more skilled or
knowledgeable parents, whose children are expected to have better outcomes, into the
group receiving higher beneﬁts. We compare the outcomes of children whose parents
arrived within a year before the reform to the outcomes of children whose parents
arrived within a year after the reform.
Figure 1: Accumulated Parental Income Over 3 Years since Immigration
According to Figure 1 the reform resulted, as expected, in lower transfer payments.
Over the ﬁrst three years in Denmark refugee parents received around 231,600 Danish
3
Kroner or 31,130 Euros less following the reform cutoﬀ compared to before.3,4 However,
parents aﬀected by the reform also had a higher earned income, indicating that the
reform motivated refugees to ﬁnd a job. This ﬁnding is consistent with Rosholm and
Vejlin (2010) and Andersen et al. (2012) who investigate the labour market consequences
of the reform. However, the increase in earned income did not fully compensate for the
fall in transfers. As Figure 1 shows, the total 3-year income of parents arriving after
the reform was about 14% lower than the income of parents arriving just before. This
income gap ceased to exist after 7 years of residence in Denmark, when both earned
income and transfers received converged for both groups, as shown in Figure 3 in the
Appendix. After 7 years of residence in Denmark refugees were again entitled to receive
the full cash beneﬁt.
At the same time raw evidence in Figure 2 shows the main result of the paper. It
suggests that there is no systematic diﬀerence in test scores between children whose
parents could receive the full cash beneﬁt and those whose parents were entitled to the
lower Start Help beneﬁt. The remainder of the paper shows that this result is robust
to controlling for various characteristics of the children and their parents. Futhermore,
there is no statistitically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in school completion or enrollment in
upper-secondary education between the two groups of refugee children. We also inves-
tigate earned income in the youth and ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence. Thus, we ﬁnd no
support for the hypothesis that children in families aﬀected by the reform worked more
hours in youth to compensate for lower parental income.
We conclude that the reduction of cash transfers improves labour market outcomes
of refugee parents in the short run, but has no impact on the education outcomes of
their children. Our ﬁndings are in line with other ﬁndings from Scandinavian research
on the impact of parental income on children's outcomes. In particular, Aakvik et al.
(2005), Loeken (2010), Humlum (2011), Loeken et al. (2012) ﬁnd that there is no or
3The average fall in overall transfers does not necessary correspond to the average fall in cash
beneﬁt payments, as refugees could substitute across beneﬁts. For example, they could apply for higher
housing support beneﬁts due to lower income. The identiﬁed fall in transfers and overall income, in
combination with increase in employment rates and employment income, is robust to controlling for
child's and parent's characteristics as shown in Table 7 in the Appendix.
4At the exchange rate 7.4376 DKK per EUR.
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Figure 2: Average Test Score in the 9th Grade Tests.
little impact of parental income on the educational outcomes and adult income of chil-
dren contrary to the U.S. research by Acemoglu and Pischke (2001), Dahl and Lochner
(2012), Oreopoulos et al. (2008) reporting a strong positive impact of parental income.
This diﬀerence across countries is at least partially explained by the Scandinavian gen-
erous welfare state. In Scandinavia children have access to any level of education inde-
pendently of parental income.5 Cross-country studies on correlations in fathers'-sons'
and brothers' earnings also show that family income is less important in Scandinvian
countries. The correlations in family earnings are much weaker in Scandinavia, pointing
5Free education is likely to eliminate the eﬀect of parental income on educational outcomes, but
not necessarily the eﬀect of parental education or ability. Such channels explain why there is far from
perfect social mobility in the Scandinavian countries.
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at parental characteristics having more limited impact on their children's outcomes in
Scandinavia than they have in the U.S. and other OECD countries (Björklund et al.
2002, Corak 2006, Schnitzlein 2014, Eurostat 2015).6
2 Policy background
The Start Help beneﬁt was introduced in 2002. It replaced a more generous cash beneﬁt
for the non-EU/EEA immigrants who could not ﬁnancially support themselves and had
lived less than seven out of the past eight years in Denmark. Consequently, the Start
Help reform primarily aﬀected recently arrived refugees and children and spouses who
were reuniﬁed with refugees.7
Before the reform, unemployed refugees and their reuniﬁed family members received
a cash beneﬁt paid by the municipality of placement. The municipality began to pay
the beneﬁt as soon as it took over the responsibility for a person from the state, namely
as soon as the person moved to a municipality from the asylum center. When a refugee
was granted a residence permit, that is, when the refugee was given a refugee status,
the municipality of placement was allowed two months to ﬁnd proper housing. Con-
sequently, refugees usually moved from the asylum center within two months after the
date of residence permit. The amount of beneﬁt did not depend on the municipality of
placement. Newly arrived individuals who received cash beneﬁt had to participate in
a special integration program, including language classes and job activation. Further-
more, they had to actively search for a job, unless they had a very poor health or had
other considerable impediments to work. The programme lasted three years, during
which the refugees had to stay in the municipality of assignment. If they moved, they
risked the loss of beneﬁts.8
The introduction of the Start Help beneﬁt aﬀected the size of the transfers, but it did
not alter the procedure of refugee allocation or the rules of the integration program.
6Another OECD (2008) study shows, that probability of son being poor if his father is poor is
considerably lower in Scandinavian countries than in the UK or the U.S. However the probability of
son being rich if the father is rich is similar across countries.
7Danish citizens were also subject to the reform.
8https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=9043.
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The Start Help beneﬁt was 36 to 48% lower than the cash beneﬁt amount refugee
families received before the reform, depending on the family type, as shown in Table
1 for 2003. Individuals who were registred in the municipalities before the 1st of July,
2002 continued to receive the entire amount of cash beneﬁt while those arriving after
faced a reduction. If the ﬁrst parent arrived before the reform took place and the other
after, the family was entitled to a low amount of transfers equivalent to two Start Help
amounts plus allowance for children.9 Refugees aﬀected by the reform received reduced
Start Help for the ﬁrst seven years since being placed to municipality. The beneﬁt was
ﬁrst abolished in 2012 implying that some families were aﬀected by the reform over
several years.10
Table 1: Examples of Yearly Amount in DKK of Start Help Beneﬁt versus Cash Beneﬁt
Transfers by Family Type in 2003
Household type Start Help beneﬁt Cash beneﬁt
One adult, no children 98,064 63,192
One adult + one child 130,308 78,996
Two adults, no children 196,128 104,784
Two adults + one child 228,372 117,888
Note: Adult above 25. https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=29615
3 Data
The data are from the Danish Administrative Registers owned by Statistics Denmark.
We select 4,829 refugee children whose second11 parent received residence permit in
Denmark during the period between the 1st of May, 2001 and the 31st of June, 2003.
Children whose second parent arrived the year before the 1st of May, 2002 are unaﬀected
by the reform and are in the control group. Children whose parents arrived the year
9In this case the ﬁrst parent would continue receiving the full amount of cash beneﬁt, whereas
the second parent would be entitled only to diﬀerence between the two Start Help beneﬁts
plus child allowance and the amount the ﬁrst parent received. http://www.socialjura.dk/content-
storage/regler/2004/vejl-9496-af-16-2004/.
10Low beneﬁts to immigrants were re-introduced in September 2015 with the so-called integration
beneﬁt which closely resembles Start Help.
11If there is only one parent, that parent's date of being granted residence permit is used.
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after the 31st of June, 2002 are aﬀected by the reform and are in the treatment group.
We exclude children whose second parent arrived in May 2002 and June 2002 from the
analysis. We do this to avoid selection problem. Parents who were granted a residence
permit two months before the 1st of July, 2002 could potentially be aﬀected by the
reform, since it could take up to two months to be moved from the refugee center to
the municipality of placement. Parent who arrived at the municipality of placement
later than the 1st of July, 2002 would only be eligible for the low Start Help beneﬁt.12
We use the date of residence of the second parent since this determines whether the
family recieves the high or the low amount of transfers.13 Information about the type
and the date of the residence permit to refugees and family reuniﬁed is available in
the administrative register on the purpose of residence, whereas the children of refugees
can be identiﬁed using population register. Children are deﬁnied as individuals who are
less than 18 years old at the date of the second parent's residence permit. We exclude
unaccompanied refugee children.
Using a personal identiﬁer we collect information about the educational outcomes
and labour market outcomes of the children, such as grade point average in the 9th
grade tests, participation in tests in Danish and Mathematics, completion of compulsory
school, enrollment in upper-secondary education and employment income. We focus on
participation in Danish and Mathematics tests, as all pupils had to be tested in these
two subjects in all school completion years we observe.14 We also collect demographic
information about the children which includes age at arrival, gender, origin, whether
the children have only one parent in Denmark and whether the children have left the
country at some point after the outcome was observed. Likewise, we obtain information
on parental education at arrival collected by Statistics Denmark to control for parental
human capital in the regressions. The parental education is self-reported and the length
of education at various stages can vary across countries. Therefore, instead of computing
12Another possibility is to use data on the date of arrival to the municipality of placement instead
of the date of residence permit. However, we choose not do so for two reasons. First, the data on date
of arrival at the municipality is more imprecise. Second, the municipality could potentially delay the
placement of certain refugees thus selecting who are in the treatment and control groups.
13In the remainder of the paper we use wording the date of the second parent's residence permit
and the arrival date interchangeably.
14Participation in other subjects was determined randomly.
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a continuous measure such as years of schooling, we deﬁne a binary variable for whether
one or both parents have completed at least an upper-secondary education.15
The outcomes of the children are observed in a 10-year window from the date of
arrival deﬁned as the date of the residence permit of the second parent. The test scores
are observed for up to 11 years since arrival.16 Ensuring that we observe outcomes for
children in the control and treatment groups for an equal number of years is important,
since the probability of completing compulsory school or enrolling in an upper-secondary
education increases the longer children have lived in the country. Children in the control
group have arrived to Denmark earlier, therefore, without this restriction, they would
be present in the longitudinal data for more years than those in the treatment group
which would bias our results.We restrict the age of the children to be at least 7 years at
arrival, so that the child can reach 17 years during the maximum of 10 years in which
we observe the child. When evaluating the earned income of the children we restrict the
age to be at least 13 years, which is the legal working age in Denmark. The summary
statistics for the variables are presented in Table 6 in the Appendix.
4 Methodology and identiﬁcation
4.1 Identiﬁcation
We argue that the Start Help beneﬁt similarly to other reforms employed in the lit-
erature (Acemoglu and Pischke 2001, Dahl and Lochner 2012, Oreopoulos et al. 2006,
2008, Sacerdote 2007)17 provides us with exogenous cutoﬀ in the size of beneﬁts refugee
families received. Use of exogenous cutoﬀ is necessary to disentangle the impact of the
reform from the impact of family characteristics, for example to avoid that more skilled
parents select in unaﬀected by the reform group. Refugee parents could not system-
15Statistics Denmark impute missing education data for some refugees. We recode all imputed data
to missing.
16Test scores are available until 2014 whereas the rest of the register data are available until 2013.
17These studies have used tax reforms, ﬁrm closures as well as quasi-random allocation of adoptees
to families to measure the impact of parental income on the child's outcomes. This approach isolates
the impact of parental skills on both - parental income and child's outcomes and allows evaluating
only the direct eﬀect of family ressources on how well the child performs at school.
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atically select into two groups obtaining the residence before and after the Start Help
reform based on their unobserved abilities, as they could not predict the introduction
of Start Help. In particular, the discussion of the reform and it's subsequent implemen-
tation lasted a very short period, so it was very diﬃcult to predict if and when it would
become eﬀective. The reform discussions were raised by a Danish centre-right govern-
ment which was formed only in the end of November 2001.18 The oﬃcial legislation was
signed in June 2002 and became eﬀective shortly after, on the 1st of July, 2002. As a
result, most of the individuals in our sample aﬀected by the new law would learn about
it in the Danish asylum camps or while waiting for their family reuniﬁcaton case to be
processed.19 To the best of our knowledge there was no change in the asylum procedure,
so the individual cases would be processed in the order they were received. Moreover,
the largest part of refugee ﬂows in 2001-2003 was driven by political disruptions, wars
and presecutions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and former Yugoslavia. Therefore, the
ﬂows of refugees from these countries would be mostly driven by the need for safety,
rather than economic motives.
Table 2 compares characteristics of the children and their parents in control and
treatment groups. Age and gender appear to be well balanced between the two groups.
There is also no diﬀerence in how likely children are to outmigrate later in life. There is
though considerable diﬀerences in ethnic composition: Afghans are overrepresentated
in the control group, whereas Iraqis are overrepresented in the treatment group. The
changes in ethnic composition of refugees were caused by political events, such as Afghan
Civil War in 1996-2001 and Iraq War in 2002-2003, and thus not related to the Danish
Start Help reform. Moreover, refugee arrivals are not clustered around the reform date,
as shown in Figure 4 in the Appendix. This suggests that refugee ﬂows were independent
of the reform. It is, however, still important to control for the country of origin, since
it could be correlated with school performance.20
18http://www.stm.dk/_p_5625.html.
19Family reuniﬁcaton cases in Denmark last several months, depending on how many applica-
tions there are submitted at a particular moment in total and how complicated each case is.
http://uibm.dk/us/kontakt-udlaendingestyrelsen.
20As a robustness check, we exclude individuals from Afghanistan and Somalia. Section 6 shows the
results which do not change compared to the baseline estimation.
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Parents of children who arrived before the reform were more likely to have at least
an upper-secondary education. This unbalance is to a considerable extend driven by
diﬀerence in country of origin: Fathers coming from Afghanistan were more likely to
report that they have at least an upper-secondary education, than fathers from Iraq.
It is impossible to distinguish whether fathers from Afghanistan were more likely to
report falsely, whether the educational requirements in Afghanistan are lower making
it easier to obtain education, or whether they indeed were better educated then Iraqis.21
Therefore, it is also important to control for parental education in the regressions. If
controls for parental education do not fully capture parental human capital, one would
expect a negative bias in the estimate of the eﬀect of the reform on educational outcomes
of children as parents arriving after the reform had lower education. Finally, we also
ﬁnd that single parent children are overrepresented in the control group. This is though
caused by the way the data were constructed as families with the second parent arriving
after the cutoﬀ are assigned to the treatment group. However, if one was concerned
about children of single parents performing worse inat school22, our results would again
be biased in the direction of ﬁnding a larger negative eﬀect of the reform.
4.2 Model
The full speciﬁcation of the model is as follows:
yi = Di +Xi + t+ origi + outi + τtest + εi (1)
where yi is the outcome of the child i. The outcome variables are the average score
in school completion tests, presence at all tests in Danish and Mathematics, school
completion per se, enrollment in an upper-secondary education and youth employment
2148 pct of fathers from Afghanistan reported having at least an upper-secondary education upon
arrival, while only 33 pct of Iraqi fathers did. The share of educated mothers is similar across countries
- 16 pct for Afganistan and 18 pct for Iraq.
22Sociological literature documents that children of single parents are disadvantaged in comparison to
children from two-parent households and underperform across various measures, including educational
outcomes (see e.g. Mulkey et al. 1992 or Downey 1994).
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income.23
Di - a dummy indicating whether the child is in the treatment (after the Start Help
reform) or the control (before the Start Help reform) group.
Xi - a vector containing the charateristics of the children and the parents measured
at the date of arrival.
t - the date of arrival.24
origi - a vector containing dummies for the three largest refugee source countries,
Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia which together account for 90 percent of refugee inﬂow
in 2001-2003.
τtest - ﬁxed eﬀects of test year, 9thgrade. The school completion tests are held at the
national level, so there is no across school variation in how complicated the tests in a
particular year are. However, there can be across year variation in the diﬃculty of the
tests. The test year ﬁxed eﬀects remove such variation.
εi - an error term.
5 Results
We begin by evaluating the impact the Start Help reform had on the average score
in the 9th grade school completion tests. This is the ﬁrst indicator of how well these
children integrate in the host country's society and what are their chances to obtain
further education and become employed.
In Table 3 we show that lower parental total income have no overall impact on how
23As explained below, it is not necessary to attend or pass all tests to complete school. In our sample
those who do not complete school are either too young, too old, dropouts or grade repeaters who delay
school completion to a point in time beyond the window of observation. Since the age distribution
is the same for the control and treatment group, diﬀerences in the school completion rate will reﬂect
diﬀerences in the fraction of dropouts and the fraction of grade repeaters.
24We use second parent's residence date instead of de facto child's arrival date, because more skilled
parents potentially could move their children to Denmark sooner compared to less skilled parents once
they had learned about their own residence permit (and child did not arrive with parents). This can
induce bias on the eﬀect of age at arrival variable. Furthermore, if parental skill composition is unequal
between the control and treatment groups it would also bias other results as we would observe the
outcomes of skilled parents' children at earlier dates.
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well the children perform at school completion tests in the 9th grade.25 The coeﬃcient
on the reform dummy is robustly insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. In ﬁve out of eight
speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcient is positive indicating a positive albeit insigniﬁcant correla-
tion between the reform and test scores. Speciﬁcation (4) contains the lowest estimate
of -0.05. This eﬀect is very modest considering that the mean test score in the sample
is 4.28 and the standard deviation is 2.25. Overall, the results indicate that the reform
did not have detrimental eﬀects on the test scores of refugee children.
The coeﬃcient signs for other characteristics are compatible with earlier ﬁndings
in the immigration literature: Children who arrive to Denmark at a later age perform
worse in school. This ﬁnding echoes the results of Böhlmark (2008), Bratsberg et al.
(2012), Ohinata and van Ours (2012), Fallesen (2015) who show that the negative
correlation between age and educational performance is present for immigrant children
in general, especially if they immigrate after the school-start age. Children who arrive
later have fewer years to learn the language and culture of the host country and perform
worse in school completion tests. Furthermore, girls obtain on average 0.4 points higher
score average at school tests compared to boys and in general girls do perform better
in school compared to boys.26,27 Parental human capital and country of origin also
aﬀects school performance. Children of parents having at least an upper-secondary
education perform better at tests, and mother's education is two to three times more
important than father's education (consistent with earlier ﬁndings by Oreopoulos et al.
2006, Holmlund et al. 2011, Pronzato 2012), according to speciﬁcations (6), (8) and (9)
in Table 3.28
25In Table 8 in the Appendix we report also that test score results for Danish and Mathematics
were not aﬀected by the reform. We chose Danish and Mathematics as the main two main subjects,
in which tests have to be taken by all children in all years.
26Girls obtain also a higher grade in language tests, but a lower grade in mathematics tests compared
to boys. Please see Table 8 in the Appendix.
27This observation is also coherent with the general pattern that girls on average perform better in
school than boys (Evalueringsinstitut 2006, OECD 2012, 2015, Konle-Seidl and Bolits 2016).
28Note, that after controlling for the parental characteristics the sign of the reform dummy changes
from negative to positive. As discussed in Identiﬁcation subsection, parents arriving before the reform
were systematically more likely to have an upper-secondary education. This induces bias in the direc-
tion of ﬁnding the negative impact of the reform on the child's outcomes. The change of sign for the
reform dummy after controlling for parental education illustrates the presence of this bias. Our con-
clusions about the impact of the reform are though unaﬀected by the bias, as in neither speciﬁcation
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In Table 4 we focus on further school outcomes. First, we focus on whether children
have attended all tests in two main subjects - Danish and Mathematics. In principle all
parts of both tests were mandatory, but in practice only 88 per cent chose to attend all
parts of the Danish tests and 91 per cent chose to attend all parts of the Mathematics
tests. The results in speciﬁcations (1)-(4) show that the particpitation rate is lower for
children aﬀected by the reform. The eﬀect is only statistically signiﬁcant for Danish
tests and it declines in statististical signiﬁcance in (2) once the set of control variables
is included. Furthermore, the robustness checks in the next section show that the
relationship ceases to exist once we limit the sample to children arriving half year
around or half year away from the reform cutoﬀ.
In the last two speciﬁcations we focus on whether the reduction in parental income
impedes school completion for the children. We do not ﬁnd that this is the case, despite
the children aﬀected by the reform were less likely to participate in all Danish tests.
An explanation for this ﬁnding is that it is not necessary to attend all school tests to
receive a school completion certiﬁcate.29
there is a statistically signiﬁcant relation between the reform dummy and test scores.
29In such a case the child would just have a dash instead of the test score in the school completion
certiﬁcate.
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We proceed by investigating whether the reform had any impact beyond the com-
pulsory school outcomes. In Table 5, speciﬁcations (1) and (2) we ﬁnd that there is no
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the probability to begin an upper-secondary educa-
tion between the two groups of children. Consequently, refugee children's educational
outcomes were not aﬀected by the reform neither while they had been in the obligatory
schooling (up to 9thgrade) nor after.
Finally, we also evaluate whether reduction in beneﬁts has increased child labour
supply to compensate for the lower parental income. Speciﬁcations (3) and (4) in Table
5 focus on the average yearly income the child earns in the ﬁrst 10 years in the country.
We only compute the average over the years where children are older than 13 years,
which is the minimum working age in Denmark. We ﬁnd no relationship between the
reform and the income of children in youth which is consistent with our main conclusion
that the reform had a limited eﬀect on school outcomes.30
30Our results are coherent with the ﬁndings in a recent survey study by Benjamisen et al. (2016)
about the deprivation of children in poor Danish families. They show that children in poor families
are aﬀected only to a limited extend by the lack of resources in the family. The study also ﬁnds
that parents in poor families compensate for the lack of ressources for children by prioritizing their
children's needs over their own needs. On the contrary, survey by Hansen (2013) shows that the lower
family income is, the more deprivation are children in those families subject to, being forced to skip
visits to dentist or having less opportunities for leisure time activities.
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6 Robustness checks
To ensure that our conclusions are not driven by a particular sample selection or spec-
iﬁcation of the model we perform a set of robustness checks in Tables (9) - (16) in the
Appendix. Each table is related to a particular outcome (test grade, participation in
tests, school completion, enrollment in upper-secondary education and child's employ-
ment income) and to save space we present only the results from the full speciﬁcation.
We employ four diﬀerent robustness checks for each outcome. In the ﬁrst robustness
check we focus on children who arrived in a half-year interval around the reform cutoﬀ
instead of a year (in periods the 1st of November, 2001 to the 30thof April, 2002 and the
1st of July, 2002 to the 31st of December, 2002). By using a shorter interval we ensure
that children and parents arrived on the both sides of the reform date are more similar
in their observed and unobserved characteristics. This is done at the expense of loosing
observations in the sample.
In the second robustness check we instead take children who arrived half a year
away from the cuttoﬀ (in periods the 1st of May, 2001 to the 30th of October, 2001
and the 1stof January, 2003 to the 30th of June, 2003). The argument for doing this
robustness check is the possibility of selection around the cutoﬀ if refugees could predict
the reform.
In the third robustness check we exclude individuals from Afghanistan and Iraq
since there is a clear diﬀerence in the ethnic composition of the control and treatment
groups. Afghans are overrepresented in the sample before the reform and Iraqis are
overrepresented in the sample after the reform. This robustness check leads to excluding
almost 80 percent of the sample. Therefore, in the main analysis, we keep all individuals
in our sample, independently of their origin.
In the fourth robustness check, we include ﬁxed eﬀects for all origin countries dum-
mies. This allows to capture the origin eﬀect for the remaining 10 percent of the sample.
The reference category consists of several origin countries with only one or two children
from each.
Finally, the reform could have had the negative impact only on the most disadvan-
taged children. In the last robustness check we focus on the outcomes of the refugee
20
children in families where at least one parent came as a Convention or a Quota refugee.
Rosholm and Vejlin (2010) argue that Convention and Quota refugees are perceived as
the weakest among refugees, having had more traumatic experiences in the past. We
do not ﬁnd any negative impact of the reform for this group of children.31
Robustness checks conﬁrm that the Start Help beneﬁt reform did not inﬂuence
negatively refugee children's grades or impede children from completing compulsory
school and enrolling in an upper-secondary education. Moreover, they also show that
the negative impact of the reform on the participation in the Danish tests is not robustly
signiﬁcant across robustness checks, furthermore enforcing conclusion that there is no
evidence that the reduction in parental beneﬁts harmed refugee children's education
outcomes.
7 Conclusion
By using an exogenous change in the size of public transfers to refugee parents, we show
that the reduction in parental transfers does not worsen educational outcomes of refugee
children at school. We compare the children whose parents received full cash beneﬁt
and those who received a lower Start Help beneﬁt. We do not ﬁnd any statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the 9th grade national tests scores, school completion probability
or probability of enrolling in an upper-secondary education between the children in two
groups. We ﬁnd some suggestive evidence that children aﬀected by the reform were less
likely to take all parts of Danish language test, but this result is not robust.
We also ﬁnd no evidence that children of parents entitled to lower beneﬁt were
forced to work and earn more to compensate for the decline in family income. On
the other hand, parental employment and earned income increased as the result of the
reform. However, the increase in earned income did not fully compensate for the fall in
31Rosholm and Vejlin (2010) also ﬁnd that Start Help reform had least impact on the Convention
refugees' chance to become employed, as despite economic encentives these refugees were not capable
of ﬁnding a job. The number of Quota refugees in their sample is too small to draw a conclusion for
them separately. Our results suggest though that employment income in families where at least one
parent is a Convention or a Quota refugees has on average increased as a result of the reform similarly
to the entire sample of refugees, see Figure 5 in the Appendix.
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transfers meaning that reform reduced welfare of the refugee families. The results are
robust to controlling for the demographic characteristics of the children, such as age at
arrival, gender and origin as well as parental education, time of arrival and year when
the school completion tests were taken.
Overall, we conclude that - at least in Scandinavian setup, where both compulsory
and upper-secondary education is provided for free - lowering cash beneﬁts to refugee
parents is not a detriment to their children's educational outcomes. At the same time,
parental labour market outcomes improve in the short run and expenses to transfers
are reduced.
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